Be Careful What You Wish For

Simon Jordan, 2013, Yellow Jersey Press
http://www.amazon.com/Be-Careful-What-You-Wish/dp/0224091824

Simon Jordan was (or is? Sorry, I am not familiar with the UK celebrity world) a model of a self-made millionaire and the owner of Crystal Palace. The book he wrote is a biography which ends 2010 when he looses ownership of the club. In a similar way like the Neil Warnock biography it provides some insights, how a club is run in England, this time not from the manager but from the chairman perspective. That is, at least, what the description says.
However, the book is more a biography of Jordan than a description of how to run a club. It starts with his childhood, moves on to how he founded he Pocket Phone Shop, a mobile phone company, and finally it describes his time at Crystal Palace. Jordan writes in chronological order, which means he moves back and force between his private life and the club life, which sometimes makes it difficult to follow how the club’s progress. I think a ghost writer would have been helpful here, to structure the whole book a bit better. I have no problem to read about his meetings with celebrities and his latest romances but it would have been better to put that in separate chapters or paragraphs, alternating with chapters about the first and second half of the soccer seasons.
What can you learn about being a chairman of a soccer club from Simon Jordan?
First of all, that soccer is no business. Jordan provides a fresh view on soccer because he wants to apply the business rules, like: make a plan what you want to do and follow it, pay by performance, value a contract. All of that is not necessarily part of the soccer world and the common sense you use in normal life is usually not followed here. There is an old boys network established and they protect themselves no matter what and cover their back. To become part of the network you have to keep your head down for quite a while, offer a lot of favors and maybe you get a chance to make use of it in the future. That is not Jordan’s way. With the head first he tries to break through the wall and tries to uncover all the nonsense and the lack of professionalism which he observes. Sometimes he is successful but often enough he has to let loose and his only hope is to create some damage at the other side, that they are more careful the next time they try to con him.
Unfortunately the details of Jordan’s work are not really described by him to really understand what he is doing with the club. The youth academy, which is probably one of his landmark achievements, is often mentioned, but what he did to build it up, how it step-by-step progressed is not explained. Similar to the Warnock biography it seems that all the work of the chairman is buying and selling players and hiring and firing managers. Again I think, that a ghost writer could have helped here, because based on his descriptions he had a constant overview about the cash flow of the club. Therefore a more detailed description about the earnings of the club would have been helpful, e.g. for tickets, merchandise, sponsoring, TV and how they developed and how it compared for Crystal Palace to the average of the league they were playing in, which back office functions a soccer club has and has to pay and how that changed when the club was promoted to Premier League. All that would have been interesting to know, also the concept and plans the managers had for the team and how they turned out and why things went wrong. Jordan describes that he asked the managers to write a plan how to get to Premier League but there is no detail given. Therefore most of the signings of players he describes sound completely arbitrary and without this background one has always the feeling the build up of the team is something which is done without any sense or plan behind it.
The other think you can learn is the fact, long known from history, that every big wealth is based on one or more crimes. Although I know that in the Anglo-American business world everything is allowed and seen as smart, as long as you are not caught, it is for me not just a minor issue that in the end the success of his business was based on using a pirated version of software from his former company and a way to get around the credit background check system of the air carrier they worked with to get new lines quickly. The example of the Pocket Phone Shop in the first parts of the book also shows that Jordan was not able to build a self-sustaining business. That might not be the first priority for a start-up company but in his description one can already see that also PPS was just before the point when they would get into trouble with cash flow, although they constantly got money by making promises into the future, and he just jumped the ship at the right time to get the maximum value out of it. In principle he tried the same with Crystal Palace but the unpredictability of soccer, an unnecessary relegation and the inability to get promoted again directly with a team paid Premier league wages, thwarted his plans. Additionally to that the financial crises, which limited the interest in high-risk investments, put an end to his juggling with investors but I think it just led quicker to the same end. There his business sense failed, too. He believed that with promotion to Premier League all financial problems would have been solved but in the end one cannot predict the results of a soccer season and must have a back up plan for the worst case. This plan never existed in both operations he led. However, in business one can predict much better the future revenue and sales or what happens if you add 10 or 20 more shops and therefore you can bet on the future to get fresh money, in soccer the future is much more random or, referring to Soccernomics, Jordan didn’t know the game. Based on Soccernomics it would have been a much better strategy to rely on the outcome of the academy and spend all the money in wages of the young players to keep them longer in the club then buying players from outside.
Nevertheless during reading the book I strongly sympathized with Simon Jordan, simply because I understand his feeling to try to break up the old boys network, feeling irritated and angry when people do not follow common sense and act in the best interest of their business. Every big organization has similar problems he tried to address, every global company with more than 50000 employees, every government organization, every big sport or charity organization. If people do not feel ownership for the organization they usually do not try to move it forward and to progress it but they try to profit from it personally to the organizations expense.
Looking from the outside, and partly from the inside as a member of a soccer club in Germany, I think the structures are more professional now for the professional soccer clubs (at least in Germany). The clubs who failed on the business side already had to step down in the last years because this part of a soccer club becomes more and more important, much to the dismay of the fans. People like Simon Jordan have a part in that by digging at the foundations of the old soccer networks and breaking them up, so that more professionalism can come into soccer which can only help the clubs to become more sustainable.

Biography: 3/3
History: 1/3
Background: 2/3
Tactics & Game philosophy: 0/3

Next book: Transition and Counter Attacking (Jan 27th)

Soccernomics

Why England Loses, Why Spain, Germany, and Brazil Win, and Why the U.S., Japan, Australia—and Even Iraq—Are Destined to Become the Kings of the World’s Most Popular Sport

Simon Kuper & Stefan Szymanski, 2014 (3rd edition), Nation Books
http://www.amazon.com/Soccernomics-England-Australia%C2%97-Iraq%C2%97Are-Destined/dp/1568584814

I have to say that I am a big fan of statistics. As a kid in school when I went in summer to my grandparents I just needed a pair of dice and a lot of paper and a pen and I started playing soccer on paper. First I just rolled the game results, later I had a more complex system, how the performance of the players affected the result of every game. I wrote endless sheets of paper full with tables, game results, the performance of the different teams and so on. Therefore this book is definitely written for people like me who analyze the world in a scientific way even soccer. That means I definitely like the book and its approach and all critique I might have is not about the quality of the text in general but because as an “expert” I might have done things differently than described in the book.
The book is split in three big chapters, one about the teams, one about fans and one about countries and a comparison of them. In all sections statistics are used to evaluate common knowledge in soccer and to understand if the general opinion is right or wrong and if the latter, what story statistics tell, how it really is. Of course the cases, when the public opinion goes wrong are far more interesting and therefore the most room is given to them. The middle part about fans is probably the least interesting. It is good to know that there are only very few hardcore fans who support only one team but statistics about who watches more games in the stadium or TV are not really interesting to understand the game. Nevertheless, what was impressive in this part was the description, how soccer stadiums and big sports events like the World Cup and Olympia are financed by the public, the profits go to private organizations and there is no measurable improvement of the countries or cities economy, which is usually the argument, during or after the event.
The last part with a comparison of the different countries and their performance internationally is more interesting. The authors make the argument that experience, talent pool and the know-how exchange with other soccer countries are the three biggest influencing factors for success of different nations. That sounds right (and is of course supported by the statistics) but I would go a step further and would think one has to look a bit deeper by judging the talent development in the different countries and not just the talent pool, that means the number of citizens in a country. Countries like the Netherlands have a much better youth development system than England and therefore get more out of a smaller pool. Other countries, e.g. in Africa, probably could do much better, if they had an organized structure of training kids and youth players. One can also see that France’s success end of the 90s was based on the talents from Clairefontaine, Spain’s success 2008, 2010 and 2012 on the youth development of La Masia and the German success last year was based on the changes made to the youth development system in the country after the horrible European Championship in 2000. It should be quite easy to compare how many players of a country play in the top 3 or top 5 leagues in the world (England, Span, Germany, Italy, France) to see which country really has the best talent pool in the world.
The most interesting part of the book comes directly at the beginning, when the authors try to explore how players can be evaluated better based on statistical data and not on gut feeling and how teams perform based on the money they use.
At first let’s talk about the players. When the book was written first in 2009 statistics were just introduced to the soccer world, after the use of statistics in baseball were made public with Moneyball and these ideas were taken over to revolutionize soccer. Today statistics are so common in soccer that even newspapers juggle with running distances, won duels and passing statistics when they try to explain why one player is better than the other. Therefore the data and stories in the book sound a bit antique.
But in my opinion even more there is a general flaw in the argumentation Kuper and Szymanski make, which is also made by several English soccer clubs as described in the book. Both focus too much on single player statistics. This works well for Baseball and American Football, because in both games the same situations are repeated continuously and under similar conditions therefore the single player performance has much more influence on the final results. The authors of Soccernomics also explain that the test of Liverpool to buy the best dribbler, the best passing midfielder a.s.o. did not result in success but their argument is that the right statistic value is not found yet (e.g. they explain that “high intensity sprints correlate better with the winning rate than the running distance alone). If statistics fail to predict the results their argument is the “dynamics” of soccer is the reason for the failure. That is not wrong but doesn’t go far enough. What they really mean is that the group tactics are no represented by simple statistics. Even the best defender in the world is not able to show a good performance when the rest of the team shows lousy work against the ball. Even the goalgetter with a high success rate of 80% per shot would not be successful when the team is not able to get the ball into the box and he has to go move backward to get the ball at all. It is not surprising that the authors make this mistake because their role model is the Premier League and that is the definitely the one of the big leagues where tactics are at a very low level. The high level of the Premier League (if it is that high at all, just check the Champions League results of the last years) is solely achieved, because the best players are there for the most money. But one can assume that in more developed countries, from the tactical point of view, much more could be done with the same players. Just to conclude, I think it is important to look at statistical data but they only tell you something, when you use them, to understand the tactical plan a team has on the field. It might be better to buy the guy with 70% passing success than the one with 90% passing success for your center midfield, when the first has better anticipation and balancing of the teams organization on the field and that is what you need for your team.
That directly ties into their next evaluation of the success of clubs and the reasons behind them, especially the influence of money and of coaches. They identified, that when it comes to money wages have the biggest influence on a team’s success not necessarily transfer payments. So it makes sense that the best/most successful players also get most of the money. The coaches they tried to analyze by comparing the league position at the end of seasons with the position one would expect from the wages and they concluded that coaches have only a small influence on the performance of their teams. I think the statistics are flawed in this comparison because in an ideal situation the best all coaches can achieve is that every team comes out equal in comparison to the expected position, that means on average in the used statistics coaches are “useless”. Using this statistics in a comparison where the ideal result is that there is no influence might be correct (e.g. when the authors look for racism in soccer) but to see if there is a positive effect of coaches you would have to use a different measure (e.g. how much do they improve a player during his time at the club, which could be based on the goal impact value). But again the results might be flawed by the use of Premier League results. Just read the biography of Neil Warnock, a better known coach in England, and you see that work on tactical details is not a focus of him but more buying and selling players. No wonder money plays such a big role for clubs in England. Maybe a wages vs. achievements list of the Champions League might be different.
Additionally to that the authors seem also to favor the entrance of sugar daddies in the soccer world and their money doping approach to soccer. The argument is that several suggar daddies competing with each other level the game for clubs which were less successful in the past and therefore give teams a chance which would have none, because they don’t have the money.
The argument is lopsided, especially when it takes the Bundesliga as negative example, where one club (Bayern Munich) dominates the rest. I think the domination of Bayern is not different than the domination of Manchester United or Real Madrid and FC Barcelona. Yes, they get the majority of the championship titles but there are always years other teams get lucky. In the last ten years only 5 of 10 championships went to Munich, the same is true for the ten years before. Most of the times teams like Dortmund, Stuttgart or Bremen were able for one or two years to have successful tranfers or they harvested the fruits of a good youth academy and therefore became competitive even with less money. A similar example is described by Kuper & Szymanski for Olympique Lyon. That means, it is possible to be better than the richest just by a good personal policy and having the right coach to make us of it. That is not only true for the top of the league, in the last four years teams like Augsburg, Fürth and Paderborn were promoted to Bundesliga the first time although they had significantly lower budgets. All of these teams were able to compete in the first league although they had not more than an above average second league budget available. What that means is there is some permeability for small teams. They might not be able to compete for ever but if the right persons are in charge they are able to surprise. Why is that in danger with sugar daddies? A good example for that in Germany is the club RB Leipzig led from Austria, which is supported by Red Bull (but you could also take the SAP supported 1899 Hoffenheim or the VW supported Wolfsburg as well). The club started in 2009 buying the license of a fifth league club and is now playing in the second league. The problem with the club is not so much that they bought second league players to play in the fifth and fourth league to get up quickly but that they also started in the region to convince youth players down to 13,14 years old to join their youth teams. At the beginning they literally tried to buy out the whole team of an age group of the club with the best youth development in the area. Although at this age one cannot make contracts with the players and pay them money one can easily pay their parents money to convince them that their kid has to change sides. Especially in East Germany, a region with high unemployment compared to the German average, that is easy to do. How many players out of these youth team will really make it to the first team? Very few, because to allow for the quick progression and promotions through the league system, every year new players are bought, which already have that level instead of taking the time to develop them. Therefore not only the players are blocked in their development these types of clubs also leave a wasteland around them because how is a club being able to compete based on good youth development and good player choice, when the best talents are already taken away, before they get even close to the first team. So, when arguing against sugar daddies, it is not because of a fight between tradition and no tradition or if money is good or bad, these type of financing a soccer club prevents to provide equal opportunity for each club to be successful with good work.
Nevertheless, the book is an excellent start to understand soccer in a better way and the mechanisms behind the scenes. Therefore it is highly recommended to read, because it provides a fresh view and new talking points when understanding success and failure in soccer.
There are now different editions of the book on the market because the authors constantly updated the text. Based on the table of contents I would say that they just added new sections to the the book based on recent developments (Sugar Daddies) or included better examples (like the rise of Spain in the last years). Therefore one should not miss anything reading the last edition only.

Biography: 0/3
History: 1/3
Background: 3/3
Tactics & Game philosophy: 0/3

Next book: Be Careful What You Wish For (Jan 17th)